Tuesday, October 20, 2020

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: REVISIONS ANDALTERNATIVES

After Marx’s death, however, and even more after that of Engelsin 1895, the inheritance began to be disputed. Almost immediatelyafter 1895, for example, Eduard Bernstein was to develop a theory

MARX AND REVOLUTIONARY ORDER67of ‘revisionism’, arguing that Marx’s predictions were not borneout by the evidence that he himself presented in Capital andelsewhere. To put the point simply, there was no sign of capitalismweakening, more that it was going from strength to strength. Andso Bernstein argued in his contribution on Karl Marx in the eleventhedition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1911 that the great scientificachievement of Marx was to be found not in such conclusions,‘but in the details and yet more in the method and principles of hisinvestigations in his philosophy of history’ (Bernstein’s emphases).Here, as was generally admitted, he had made an originalcontribution. Bernstein continued:Nobody before him had so clearly shown the role of theproductive agencies in historical evolution; nobody so mas-terfully exhibited their great determining influence on theforms and ideologies of social organisms. The passagesand chapters dealing with this subject form,notwithstanding occasional exaggerations, the crowningparts of his works. If he has been justly compared withDarwin, it is in these respects that he ranks with that greatgenius, not through his value theory, ingenious though itbe. With the great theorist of biological transformation hehad also in common the indefatigable way in which hemade painstak-ing studies of the minutest detailsconnected with his researches.It is almost as if Marx the scholar were the superior to Marx thepolitician. By implication, political analysis was better providedby Bernstein himself.While Bernstein developed his ‘revisionism’, a self-styleddefender of ‘orthodox’ Marxism emerged in the person of KarlKautsky. However, while insisting on revolutionary goals,Kautsky also believed that socialism could be, indeed shouldbe, realised through the agency of a mass movement operatingin the conditions of parliamentary democracy. He was thereforeopposed to violent action, especially by a minority, and couldonly look upon the Bolshevik Revolution as premature and as adistortion of Marxism. He also differed with Lenin on the subjectof imperialism, especially on the centrality of financial capital.Yet another view of imperialism was that of Rosa Luxemburg,who emphasised that the expansion of capitalism depended on
the exploitation of pre-capitalist societies. Like Kautsky,although more of a radical revolutionary than he, she wasopposed to the manner in which Lenin and the Bolsheviks hadforced the pace in 1917.32In Russia itself, a number of socialists looked upon October 1917and after as a jumping of the Marxist gun. Chief among them werethe Mensheviks, who looked upon the October Revolution aspremature, believing that it was necessary for capitalism to run itsfull course before it could be overthrown, and possibly alsodisagreeing with the late Marx himself. Then there were those whowere socialists but not Marxists, especially the SocialistRevolutionaries who stemmed from the populist tradition, and alsoanarchists of varying complexions, including the great Kropotkin,opposed to the new regime from the liber-tarian point of view. Ofcourse, the old regime still had its supporters, monarchists orconstitutional monarchists, while a further, fresh interpretation ofthe whole Russian Revolution came from the Eurasian orEuropasian school.33A good example of Russian liberal reactions to the successivestages of war and revolution may be found in the writings ofLenin’s former pet aversion Paul Vinogradoff, professor ofjurisprudence at Oxford University. In September 1914, he wrotea long letter to The Times of London, recounting how a friend, aliberal like himself, had written from Moscow: ‘It is a great,unforgettable time; we are happy to be all at one!’ In Vinogra-doff’s view, the intelligentsia, ‘imbued with current Europeanideas as to politics, economics and law’, would be able tocollaborate with the rest of the people in the pursuit of victory.And it should be recognised that the Russian people were notbackward in comparison with the German, and would be ableto show remarkable patience in the face of suffering. It was anadvantage at this time of crisis that the government was stronglycentralised, and that the tsar could now demonstrate his states-manship, which would include his recognition that there shouldbe further constitutional advances at the end of the war. DeclaredVinogradoff: ‘The Slavs must have their chance in the history ofthe world, and the date of their coming of age will mark a newdeparture in the growth of civilization.’ In 1915, after a visit tohis native land, he observed that ‘there is no more occasion todoubt of ultimate progress in the field of domestic politics thanthere is to be nervous as to the outcome of the struggle in the
field.’ Then, in 1917, although he wrote of the ‘catastrophe ofMarch’ and the manner in which the tsar had been brought downby the court camarilla, he was also happy to note that ‘Russiahas shaken off her fetters.’ The February or March Revolutionhad shaken the pyramid of society to its foundations, but couldnot overturn it. The future would bring the glory of a freecommonwealth justifying the faith of Russia in their ownpowers.But the October or November Revolution of 1917 did indeedoverturn the pyramid of Russian society, and undermine theconfidence of Vinogradoff in the immediate future. In 1919,he ventured still to remark: ‘This summer will, let us hope,decide the downfall of the criminal gang which has broughtruin to the country.’ Then, probably, a military dictatorshipwould have to be instituted as a necessary transitional stage.Certainly, ‘strong executive organisation will have to be keptup’, for ‘interdepen-dence between authority and right is theessence and the common trait of all constitutions.’ Two yearslater, in the summer of 1921, Vinogradoff’s hopes for thecollapse of Bolshevism were still unrealised as he commentedthat the new government had been trying to shape the wholeof Russia in the barrack mould associated with Arakcheev,responsible for military colonies in the nineteenth century. Hecould not now believe in the imminent demise of the Bolshevikregime, and lamented that ‘Salvation will not come from theemigrants or from the Allies. It can only be expected from anelemental crisis in an illness which is bound to be a protractedand an agonising one.’34In the twelfth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, publishedin 1922, Vinogradoff was able to give his extended views underthe entry ‘Russia’, observing:Altogether the ‘Constitution’ of the Federal Republic ofSoviets was clearly intended to be an instrument for theoppression of the formerly privileged classes and a meansof propaganda for the edification of people who want tobelieve in the benefits of Communist rule.However, Vinogradoff commented, ‘Pure Communism can beintroduced only when the people have been ground into uniformpulp: then Law and the State will disappear of themselves.’ He
quoted with scorn the claims of the Bolshevik theorist N.I.Bukharin that:The Soviets are direct organizations of the masses; theyare not impermeable, there is the right of recall.... Indemocratic commonwealths the supreme power belongsto par-liaments, that is, to talking-shops.... The real rulersare the members of a caste, —of a social bureaucracy.Vinogradoff sarcastically added, ‘One might think that the ruleof Soviets was free from all fictions and substitution of power.’ Inparticular, Bukharin and his comrades had sought to justify thedismissal of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918 with theclaim that it did not reflect the ‘will of the revolution’. This actuallymeant ‘simply the arbitrary sway of a gang of recklessadventurers’.35As for non-affiliated historians, many of them lived throughthe Revolution of 1917 to confront again the problems which hadpreoccupied them before the sequence of shattering events begunin 1914. Among the survivors was E.V.Tarle, who presented hisnew thinking in an article published in 1922 and entitled ‘The NextTask’, a piece of work deserving close scrutiny not only because ofits observations on 1922 but also because of its implications for the1990s.36Nobody, Tarle claimed at the outset, could claim acomprehensive grasp, but many questions were being posed: forexample, how did the Muscovite state grow, not according to thetwenty-nine volumes of S.M.Soloviev’s History of Russia from theEarliest Times published from 1851 to 1879, but in reality? Asatisfactory answer was elusive, for two main reasons: first, theincreasing multiplicity of facts, both from the archives and fromthe growth of new disciplines, especially economic history, whichwas threatening to overwhelm scholars from the beginning of thetwentieth century onwards; and second, the growing complicationsof psychology, which made necessary the broadening of horizons.Moreover, the more difficult the task of criticism, the more attractiveit became, and so critics and polemicists had become morenumerous than systematists and constructors.The recent great catastrophe had struck deep into the psychologyof that numerically insignificant group of people who had chosenas their life’s work the investigation of humanity’s past. What werethe consequences for them?
Declared Tarle:The question is at least not unimportant for this group ofpeople. It is time if not to investigate it, at least to pose it.One of the greatest virtues and duties of the historian ismistrustfulness. Must we, as we regain consciousness, withmistrustfulness turn first of all to address ourselves andattempt to establish: how has the apparatus of our thoughtchanged? Are we more or less capable of coping andunderstanding than before? The following argument maybe more natural, then: that we looked at the states, theirforces, the correlation between these forces, at thepsychology of the Russian people, at a multitude ofphenomena, in a different manner to how we look at themnow; and we know for certain that not only have thesephenomena changed, but that we simply did notunderstand them very much, that we looked at manythings in an unreal fashion and accepted phantoms asreality. If so, why should we think that our views of historywere without error? If we in 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916accepted, let us say, the Russian people as somebody else,then where is the guarantee that we know and understandbetter the Romans, the Greeks, the Franks, thecontemporaries of Charles V or Louis XVI or Napoleon?In death, asserted Turgenev, there is some kind of definitivetruth. Revolution is always first and foremost death, thenlife. That is why with each cataclysm there perish verymany old phantoms and lies. And immediately too, ofcourse, there are born new ones, but in each case, theprocess of recovery from old phantasmagorias is capableof shaking the strongest intellectual self-confidence.And just at this difficult period of the loss of faith incorrectness of a whole range of their former convictions,the historians who have undergone the cataclysm aresubjected to new and powerful temptations, their intellectis diverted from its direct scientific importance bypowerful, often uncertain influences.37Tarle went on to argue that history must be written notexclusively as narrative, but to establish the facts, and then toexplain them. Certainly, history must not be written as advocacy,a practice into which generations following cataclysms too easily
fell. The French Revolution could be discussed quietly only thirtyyears afterwards, and then only exceptionally. Robespierre stillquarrelled with Danton, but the first was impersonated byMathiez, the second by Aulard, and they were both professors ofhistory. There were many other such examples, even a centuryand a quarter on.Cataclysms also fogged vision, distorting the outlook of manyhistorians and leading them into pseudo-history, which Tarledefined as what ensues when historians address some subject,but set out in allegorical or cryptographic form another subject,the history of their own time or near to it, modernising motiv-ation. Such pseudo-history had been rare in Russia,38 but wasespecially attractive in epochs after storms. First, there was thesearch for analogies and antecedents, then the emergence ofallegory and cryptogram. French historiography of the firstquarter, even the first half of the nineteenth century had lookedfor a revolutionary bourgeoisie in the twelfth and thirteenthcenturies, for the outlook of 1789 in the States-General of thefifteenth century. The same tendency would soon appear amongRussian historians, in Tarle’s estimation—its chief disadvantagewas that it divided and thus weakened the understanding.Historians must remember that the situation ‘is not an advantagefor our generation, but, on the contrary, something capable ofseriously lowering the analytical capabilities of even the strongestintellect’.39However, there was a positive side to the present predicamentof 1922. Such epochs promoted understanding of what in othertimes would not be completely clear, an empty sound. Examplescould be found in the Renaissance writings of Machiavelli andGuicciardini, while the great Ranke drew extensively on the minorClarendon, his superior regarding the experience of the EnglishRevolution, although in other respects comparison would beludicrous. Similarly, Voltaire appeared superficial and insipidcompared to lesser figures who actually lived through the FrenchRevolution.The way forward must avoid several pitfalls. History must notsimply tell a story, nor relapse into advocacy. It must not becomepseudo-history, allowing a poetic rendering of ideas to take over,as tended to happen during cataclysms, for example the years 1789–99. The great catastrophe of the 1914 war, followed by the RussianRevolution, posed such a threat because it had first caused death
But then it produced new life, as the old gave way to the new. Onthe one hand, Tarle and his generation were faced by a situation‘capable of lowering the analytical capabilities of the strongestintellect’; on the other, there was the advantage of being in a positionto react to the immediacy of experience. Continued Tarle:Auguste Comte ascribed great methodological significanceto the study of revolutionary overtures; even greatersignificance in this connection is possessed by the personalexperience of such events. The old fabric is torn, ends andbeginnings are laid bare, and an element appears, whichat other times cannot be seen, and whose presence canonly be implied. The main point is that you observe theworthlessness of the historical significance of the rationalfoundation, all the particular, inhuman, but somehowdifferent boundless logic, which, to be sure, is dominanteven in ordinary times, but is overshadowed by the publicplatform and the press, in words, in gestures, in shouts,arguments, discussions, articles—in a word, by everythingwhich masks with such success and hides from our view—in normal epochs—the true motivating forces of thehistorical process. States, apparently eternal, fly into pieces,the state culture turns out to be a superficial covering,primeval chaos envelops and overwhelms the shell, whichhas only just seemed an unbreakable and majestic ark. Itseems to some nervous people caught up in such a cyclonethat they are going out of their minds and becomingdelirious. On the contrary, they were previously delirious,lulled by a false security, forgetting that not far under theelegant carpet of their cabin there is a dark and fathomlessabyss, and that this abyss is the age-old natural reality, andthat their cabin is a fragile and artificial invention; that theabyss existed before the cabin, and will remain after thecabin, and they themselves may study the abyss, if onlyimperfectly, but they may in no way control it. The mostthey can do is to try to delay the wreck of their ark.40In the view of Tarle, after such an experience, the intellect couldonly grow stronger or weaker; it could not stay still.Looking around him in 1922, Tarle could not find much causefor optimism. He gave his verdict, for example, on Outline of
History by H.G.Wells: an author who combined elements of JulesVerne and Jack London deluded himself into believing that hewas solving all the mysteries of world history with his gleaningsfrom secondary-level textbooks mixed with vulgar philosophyand paradoxes. Yet this work had been taken seriously by a wholegroup of British academics, and many other similar examplescould be given. Declared Tarle: ‘Whether there will appear thelong-awaited serious schemes and theories, or whether there willbe in this sphere the dilettante thinking aloud begun in 1914 andbecoming stronger in 1917, leading nowhere, and with no future—time alone will tell.’41Tarle believed that a growing academic exchange with Europeand America could and would have to be one source of fruitfulthought in conditions of continuing cataclysm. But fact gatheringmust not be abandoned: indeed, he asserted, ‘The more powerful,the more authentic the generalising thought, the more it needs theerudite and erudition.’ To put the matter simply, the seventeenthcentury had produced erudition, the eighteenth had producedphilosophy. For its part, the early nineteenth century had broughtforward theory along with some erudition and criticism, while inthe late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, erudition andcriticism had grown, but so-called ‘philosophy’ had fallen to thelow level that might be found only in remote epochs. Moreover,‘philosophy’ in the eighteenth-century sense was no longer enough,because of the much higher level of erudition.Erudition should not be undervalued, Tarle observed:But never will our present architect, a builder by profession,begin to pour scorn and sarcasm on those who inexpectation of his arrival have collected and polished thestones and marble, inspected and thrown away unsuitablematerial—and sometimes even participated in the layingof the foundation.However, on the other hand, in Tarle’s estimation, erudition shouldnever be identified with science, nauka.42Some earlier attempts at schematisation had suffered from avariety of weaknesses. For example, the eighteenth-centuryPhysiocrats had explained Chinese and Egyptian history whileknowing little or nothing about it. With a similar handicap in thenineteenth century, Hegel had attempted to distil the spirit of Indian
history. But was Hegel disturbed when facts contra-dicted histheory? No, the worse for the facts, in Hegel’s view. Suchconstructors of systems had been close in their outlook to theCameralists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who madethe interests of absolute rulers absolute. Wrote one of them: ‘Mayhe be damned who is predisposed to distinguish the interests ofthe sovereign from those of his subjects.’ Such servility was asunhelpful as disregard for facts. In conclusion, Tarle lookedforward:We will hope that the beginning of the twentieth centuryturns out to be similar to the beginning of the nineteenthnot only in destruction on an international scale of severalmillion people, but also with the appearance of a galaxyof synthesising minds and talents. The time for the harvesthas already arrived; perhaps the reapers are approaching.43We are all too familiar with what was actually approaching:reapers who were grim indeed, a servility before absolute rulersthat would outstrip that of the Cameralists, and thesuperimposition on events of a crude schema. After a period in theGulag, Tarle himself, if without losing all his scholarly attributes,was to become one of the leading Stalinist historians, as we shallsee in Chapter 4. But I have not devoted such close attention to hisattitude in 1922 to the question of ‘The Next Task’ in order to spinout a cautionary tale, but rather to throw light on the problemsfaced by Tarle’s successors seventy years on, in the 1990s, as theytoo confront revolution.To give too much emphasis to the parallel would be to fall intothe trap of the search for analogy and antecedent, which Tarleadvises us to avoid, seeing it as a step towards allegory andcryptogram. Nevertheless, the following comments appearpertinent to any discussion of writing on history in the 1990s. First,seventy years ago, Tarle wrote in a language rarely found amonghis successors today, rich in vocabulary and subtlety of expression.Second, Tarle showed himself to be a scholar of broad education,familiar with classical and more recent culture, if mostlyEurocentric. Here, no doubt, Tarle would reflect the normalstandards of his time, especially for specialists in general,vseobshchaia, history. For similar reasons and also, third, becausehe was a specialist in this area, Tarle made an inordinate number
of references to French history, in particular the French Revolution,although we should not neglect the obvious point that the FrenchRevolution was the antecedent and analogy for the Russian, andallow Tarle to fall at least some way into his own trap. It certainlyis striking how frequently Annaly: zhurnal vseobshchei istorii, 1922–4 (published in Petersburg by Petrograd Publishers in which Tarle’sarticle on ‘The Next Task’ first appeared), refers to the FrenchRevolution as the Great Revolu-tion.44 Equally, and fourth, like thejournal of which he was co-editor, Tarle makes little reference tothe Russian Revolution, and, perhaps more surprisingly, not onemention of Karl Marx, let alone V.I.Lenin.Even after the turbulent years 1917–21, then, the Russianhistoriographical tradition from Karamzin through Soloviev toKliuchevsky was still alive. Quite possibly in 1922, Tarle alsoharboured thoughts about constitutional development similar tothose of Kovalevsky and Vinogradoff, along lines advocated bythe American President Woodrow Wilson. Even Lenin, as we haveseen, found it necessary to consider both theoretical and practicalproblems of constitutionalism as he moved from Russian Republictowards Soviet Union. On the whole, however, Trotsky wasprobably accurate in his observation that Lenin’s ‘thoughts neverceased to labour at the task of freeing the workers’. After Lenin’sdeath, Trotsky kept the banner of proletarian revolution flyingwhile Stalin moved further in the direction of constitutionalism(however distorted or even perverted). The original thoughts ofMarx were by now far from the minds of the Soviet establishment,however much they used ‘Marxism-Leninism’ as an ideologicalunderpinning for their own power.But we are running ahead of ourselves. Before moving on, wemust return to our promised second pH test and confess that ourattention in this chapter has focused much more on Russian ‘acid’than on American ‘alkali’. Here, the reading for Russia would betowards the extreme, while that for the USA would barely register.The reason for this imbalance, as already indicated, is thatrevolutionary Marxism made little immediate impact in the USA.As Marx himself had indicated in Capital, this was partly becauseof the lack of American communal and feudal development, partlybecause of the USA’s possession to an unprecedented level of ‘thefluidity of capital, the versatility of labour and the indifference ofthe worker to the content of his work’ (see p. 55 above). As we turnour attention to the views of world order put forward from the
beginning of the twentieth century by a selection of E.V.Tarle’sEuropean colleagues, we shall clearly see that the Atlantic remaineda broad divide and that the USA was still not quite accepted as afully mature member of the Western world, even if without doubtpoised for rapid emergence to leadership of that world. At the sametime, the kind of constitutional order asserted by Woodrow Wilsonin his academic publications was soon to be proclaimed by him onthe wider global stage

 

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: LENIN, TROTSKYAND STALIN

 Marx’s own thought, as has been increasingly realised, is a far cryfrom ‘Marxism-Leninism’, which was an invention of the Stalinistperiod, and would not have been recognised as his own by eitherof its alleged progenitors. Furthermore, we need to recall, therewere many other analyses besides those of Marx and Leninconcerned with the revolutionary direction that Russia was takingboth before and even after the Revolution of 1917. Here, we willtake just two examples of the constitutional persuasion.Maxim Kovalevsky was for a time a close collaborator of Marxbut came to the conclusion that it was possible for constitutionalgovernment on the Western model to find roots in Russia. Inparticular, disagreeing with Marx here as well as elsewhere,Kovalevsky argued that communal property would become privatein Russia as a wider process already nearer completion in otherlands began to gather momentum nearer home. In a Preface to atranslation of Woodrow Wilson’s The State published in the year1905 he declared:Not cut off by a Chinese wall from the civilised world,possessing in our past those selfsame rudiments of freedevelopment as were shown by Western Europe in theMiddle Ages, and in the contemporary transformation ofstate estates into economic classes—the guarantee of thechangeover to the system of self-government of society,we, evidently, are bound by necessity to interest ourselvesin the solutions reached by the races of the German-Romanworld. These solutions might be reached by us in the nearfuture, but not because of inorganic borrowing, but becauseof the force of circumstances, by our intellectual andeconomic development, by the transformation of ourcontemporary state order.18Not so optimistic as Kovalevsky was the leading historian ofthe period, V.O.Kliuchevsky. In the early nineteenth century,N.M.Karamzin and his contemporaries had produced an account
of the story of Russia centred on successive rulers and implyingthat the general direction was progressive. Nearly a hundred yearson, Kliuchevsky sought to present an analysis of the many-sidedactivities of the empire’s peoples, a ‘historical sociology’. Hebelieved that he could achieve his aim only if the national historywas taken to be part of a larger whole, with outside as well asinternal pressures given their due weighting. But while he mighthave liked to have adopted the same forward movement asKaramzin, Kliuchevsky found himself inhibited by a number ofconsiderations. To take first the most important of them:The law of the life of backward states or peoples amongthose which have outstripped it is that the need for reformarises earlier than the people is ready for reform. Thenecessity for accelerated movement in pursuit leads to theover-hasty adoption of the ways of others.Moreover:the means of west European culture, falling into the handsof some narrow strata of society, have been turned to theirdefence rather than the advantage of the country,strengthening social inequality, have been changed into aweapon for the many-sided exploitation of the culturallydefenceless masses, lowering the level of their socialconsciousness and strengthening their class animosity, bywhich they are prepared for revolt rather than freedom.Meanwhile, the tragedy of the opposition was that ‘the patriotenlightened at government expense was struggling against his owncountry, while not believing in the power of enlightenment or inthe future of the motherland.’19Unlike his counterparts in Great Britain, France and the UnitedStates of America, then, Kliuchevsky was unable to present a‘Whig’ view of Russian history, that is ‘to praise revolutionsprovided they have been successful, to emphasise certainprinciples of progress in the past and to produce a story which isthe ratification if not the glorification of the present’.20 He livedlong enough after the Russian Revolution of 1905 to realise thatthe hopes held out for meaningful constitutional reform werecoming to naught, and that it was unlikely that Russia wouldfollow the path of its Western predecessors
Oddly enough, the individual who did most to divert Russiaalong its own way, V.I.Lenin, himself at first appears to haveargued that Russia would follow the Western path. In his firstlarge-scale work, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, comingout in 1899, he indicated the manner in which the stratificationof the peasantry was leading towards the arrival of capitalism inrural areas. In other words, at this point, he was in agreementwith the Marx of Capital, rather than of the Preface to the 1882Russian edition of The Communist Manifesto, which suggested thepossibility of direct passage from the peasant commune to thehigher form of communism, with the Russian Revolution as acomplement for the proletarian revolution in the West. FollowingMarx, as well as the tradition of the Russian intelligentsia, Leninargued in What is to be Done?, published in 1902, that theproletariat was the key class in the movement forward, guidedby a party equipped with the appropriate theory.Then came the Revolution of 1905, which confirmed for Leninthe impossibility of Russia following any road other than theMarxist, and encouraged him to pour scorn on those who offeredalternatives. For example, he ridiculed the assertion of theémigré Paul Vinogradoff, professor of jurisprudence at Oxford,that it was necessary to strive with all possible might to ensurethat Russia should move forward along lines comparable tothose of Germany in 1848 rather than those of France in 1789. InVinogradoff’s view, the latter would lead Russian society intodanger, even to ruin. For Lenin, Vinogradoff was a lackey of theRussian bourgeoisie who feared the victory of the people, andapproved of revolution only when, as in 1848, it wasunsuccessful, rather than when, as in 1789, it enjoyed at leastsome success.21After the limited success and ultimate failure of theRevolution of 1905, Lenin argued that Russia could proceedalong one of two paths: either towards a capitalist landlordJunker economy, comparable to Germany; or towards thedevelopment of small peasant farming, comparable, at least inits basic freedom, to the USA.22 In such analogies, and in hisconsideration of Europe, Asia and the USA, as always Lenintook a worldview, if concentrating on Russia rather than itswider context. From 1907, Lenin saw his homeland followingthe Junker path, although he also perceived that industrialdevelopment in some regions would allow the proletariat to gain
strength. The outbreak of war in 1914 persuaded him to thinkof the possibilities of revolution on a wider scale.Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline waswritten by Lenin between January and June 1916, and publishedin 1917. It begins by asserting that during the previous fifteen totwenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War of 1898and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, the economic and politicalliterature of the two hemispheres had increasingly adopted theterm ‘imperialism’ to describe the ensuing era. For example, a bookwith the term as its title had been brought out in London and NewYork by J.A.Hobson, an English economist with a point of view of‘bourgeois social-reformism and pacifism’. While borrowingheavily from Hobson, Lenin would also seek to deal with theprincipal economic aspects of the phenomenon in a differentmanner.By the end of the nineteenth century, Africa and Polynesia hadbeen divided up by the capitalist countries to complete their seizureof the unoccupied territories of the planet. In 1852, Disraeli haddeclared: ‘The colonies are millstones round our necks’, but justover thirty years later, Britain was leading the scramble for theiracquisition, fairly closely followed by France, with Germany,Belgium and Portugal among the European powers in pursuit. Bythe end of the century, the field had broadened beyond Europe;Russia, Japan and the USA were also variously involved in therace for empire, which Joseph Chamberlain was now describingas a ‘true, wise and economi-cal policy’, while Cecil Rhodes wasdeclaring: ‘If you want to avoid civil war, you must becomeimperialists.’As well as quoting bourgeois authorities as much as possible,since they were forced ‘to admit the particularly incontrovertiblefacts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy’, Lenin setout what he saw as the five basic features of imperialism:1. the concentration of production and capital hasdeveloped to such a high stage that it has createdmonopolies which play a decisive role in economic life;2. the merging of bank capital with industrial capital,and the creation, on the basis of this ‘finance capital’, of afinancial oligarchy;3. the export of capital as distinguished from the exportof commodities acquires exceptional importance;the formation of international monopolist capitalistassociations which share the world among themselves; and5. the territorial division of the whole world among thebiggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism iscapitalism at that stage of development at which thedominance of monopolies and finance capital isestablished; in which the export of capital has acquiredpro-nounced importance; in which the division of theworld among the international trusts has begun; in whichthe division of all territories of the globe among the biggestcapitalist powers has been completed.Towards the end of his work, Lenin referred to the three periodssuggested by the American writer David Jayne Hill in A History ofDiplomacy in the International Development of Europe: (1) the era ofrevolution; (2) the constitutional movement; (3) the then presentera of ‘commercial imperialism’. And he concluded by affirmingthat, although such a new stage in human development had beenreached, its fundamental nature was already apparent in Marx’s‘precise, scientific analysis’.23In the Preface to Imperialism which Lenin wrote in the spring of1917, he pointed out how it had been written with an eye on thecensor, and that therefore he had been forced to omit theobservations that:the period of imperialism is the eve of the socialistrevolution; that social chauvinism (socialism in words,chauvinism in deeds) is utter betrayal of socialism,complete desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie; that thissplit in the working-class movement is bound up with theobjective conditions of imperialism.Just over three years later, in another Preface, to the French andGerman editions of Imperialism, Lenin claimed that his work hadproved that ‘the war of 1914–18 was imperialist (that is, anannexationist, predatory, war of plunder) on the part of both sides;it was a war for the division of the world.’ With the war over, the‘booty’ was shared between ‘two or three powerful worldplunderers armed to the teeth’ —America, Great Britain, Japan,who were involving the whole world in ‘their war over the divisionof their booty’. Tens of millions were ‘dead and maimed’ in the
war, while the ‘peace treaties’ were opening the eyes of the samenumber and more—‘downtrodden, oppressed, deceived andduped by the bourgeoisie’, while a thousand million more werebecoming further embroiled in imperialism through theconstruction of railways. Thus: ‘out of the universal ruin causedby the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which,however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot endotherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory.’24By this time, the summer of 1920, Russia itself had been involvedfor about two years in a civil war in the wake of the OctoberRevolution of 1917 which had brought Lenin and his fellowBolsheviks to power. At home, then, in a sense, the revolutionarywas becoming a constitutionalist, or, at least, having sought formost of his adult life to overthrow a government, he was nowattempting to keep a government in power. And not just anygovernment, but one representing both the workers and thepeasants of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and theircomrades in the wider world. On the other hand, Russia’s regimecould not become fully constitutional until the achievement ofsocialist modernisation at home and of revolution in the widerworld. To put it another way, at the same time, he had to beconscious of the sets of circumstances which he had described in,respectively, The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Imperialism:The Highest Stage of Capitalism.A further dimension to the years immediately following theOctober Revolution was the confrontation of the highest hopes withthe deepest difficulties. Lenin himself considered these continually,for example in a speech to the Congress of School ExtensionWorkers in the spring of 1919, with arguments suggesting an updateof those of Robespierre at the end of 1793:We say to the bourgeois intellectuals, to the adherents ofdemocracy: ‘You lie when you reproach us with theinfringement of freedom. When your great bourgeois revol-utionists of 1649 in England and of 1792–3 in France carriedthrough their revolutions they did not concede to themonarchists the freedom of meetings. The FrenchRevolution was called the Great one because it was notlike the weakly phrase-making revolution of 1848: afteroverthrow-ing the monarchists it crushed them out ofexistence.... He who imagines that the transition to
socialism will be effected by one man convincing another,and this other a third, etc., is at best a child, or a politicalhypocrite. You can, if you have luck, smash an institutionat one blow: it is impossible to smash a habit, whateveryour luck. We have given the land to the peasant, freedhim from the squire, thrown off all his fetters, and yet hegoes on thinking that liberty is free trade in corn, andserfdom the duty to surrender the surplus at a fixed price.’25Here again, then, was Lenin necessarily thinking of the problemsof the peasantry as part of the transition via proletarian revolutionto socialism, a combination that was to lead to the introduction ofthe New Economic Policy in 1921.According to the assessment of the thirteenth edition of theEncyclopaedia Britannica in 1926, up to Lenin’s death early in 1924,his ‘thoughts never ceased to labour at the task of freeing theworkers’.26 This was the conclusion of the author of that assessment,none other than Leon Trotsky, about to fail in the struggle forsuccession with Stalin, but determined to continue the fight forinternational proletarian collaboration and world revolutionbeyond his expulsion from the Soviet Union in 1929 right up to hisassassination by Stalin’s agent in 1940.Trotsky set out his overview of history, following the law of‘uneven and combined development’, in the first chapter of TheHistory of the Russian Revolution, which he completed in exile abouta dozen years after playing a major part in that great drama: ‘Thefundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slowtempo of her development, with the economic backwardness,primitiveness of social forms and low level of culture resulting fromit.’ In comparison with the leading countries of the West inparticular, Russia would be numbered among those backwardcountries which revealed with the greatest sharpness andcomplexity in their destiny the most general law of the historicprocess—unevenness. From that law derived another involving ‘adrawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combiningof separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporaryforms’, a law which was to be called ‘the law of combineddevelopment’.Thus, medieval Russia lacked cities as centres of commerce andcraft, with significant social consequences. And so when it cameto the Pugachev Revolt of the late eighteenth century, there could
be no conversion into revolution because of the lack of an ingredientmost apparent in France—a Third Estate. A century later, however,the Europeanisation and modernisation of Russia were especiallynoticeable in industry, which went on to double its productionbetween 1905 and 1914. Now, the law of combined developmentrevealed itself most forcibly in this economic sphere. While morethan 80 per cent of the people were involved in agriculture, whichstill often used seventeenth-century methods, Russian industry insome aspects had caught up with and even outstripped itsadvanced rivals—for example, in the number of large-scaleenterprises and in the confluence of industrial with financial capital.But this latter circumstance meant the subjection of much of Russianindustry to the Western European money market.27As with capitalism, so with socialism, ‘uneven and combineddevelopment’ would continue in a global situation characterisedby Trotsky as ‘permanent revolution’. Looking backwards, heargued that in 1905 revolutionary Russia had revealed to the worldthe most advanced form of proletarian organisation, the soviet,moving on from the Paris sansculottes of 1789 and even thecommunists of 1871 to a higher level of proletarian consciousness.Then, in 1917, the soviet forces had achieved a great victory incombination with the peasants, for whom the proletarians hadprovided leadership. However, in Trotsky’s estimate, there wereother lessons to be drawn from 1905 and 1917. For backwardcountries the road to democracy was by way of the dictatorship ofthe proletariat. Consequently, a permanent state of revolutionarydevelopment was established between the democratic revolutionand the socialist reconstruc-tion of society. At the same time,indefinitely and constantly, all social relations were undergoingtransformation, with attendant periods of war and peace, scientificand moral adaptations, never allowing the achievement ofequilibrium. A final aspect of permanent revolution was itsinternational character. The socialist revolution might have begunon national foundations, but it could not continue in that fashionwithout succumbing through contradictions.28Trotsky made these observations in 1930, revising others madeat the time of the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917. By 1930, of course,Lenin had been dead for about half a dozen years, Trotsky hadbeen recently ejected from the Soviet Union, and power had beeneffectively commandeered by Stalin and his supporters. Duringthe next decade, a brand of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ was to be
developed that was in fact Stalinism. Most succinctly, Stalin himselfhad declared in ‘The Foundations of Leninism’ first published inPravda soon after Lenin’s death in 1924: ‘The combination ofRussian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is theessence of Leninism in Party and state work.’ Lenin, he argued,had ridiculed the theory of permanent revolution, whose advocates‘have not only underestimated the role of the peasantry in theRussian revolution and the importance of the idea of the hegemonyof the proletariat, but have altered (for the worse) Marx’s idea of“permanent revolution” and made it unfit for practical use.’29By 1931, the peasantry had been crushed by collectivisation andthe proletariat committed to the fulfilment of the grandiose targetsof the first Five-Year Plan. In a famous speech, Stalin hammeredhome a simple message:To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. Andthose who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want tobe beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of thehistory of old Russia was the continual beatings shesuffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten bythe Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys.She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She wasbeaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beatenby the British and French capitalists. She was beaten bythe Japanese barons. All beat her—because of herbackwardness, because of her military backwardness,cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrialbackwardness, agricultural backwardness.... We are fiftyor a hundred years behind the advanced countries. Wemust make good this distance in ten years. Either we shalldo it, or we shall go under.30In a sense, Stalin’s argument was vindicated by the fact thatthe Soviet Union was able to withstand the attack launched byNazi Germany in the summer of 1941. On the other hand, notonly did that attack take him by surprise, he had previouslydetracted from the success of the Five-Year Plans by his purges.Furthermore, his repetitious rhetoric distorted the nature ofRussian history. From victory over the Swedes in 1709 to thetriumph over Napoleon in 1812, tsarist Russia had won morebattles than it had lost. In the years leading up to 1914, somewould claim, tsarist Russia was catching up with the advancedcountries more quickly than the Soviet Union would manage todo after 1917.The historical debate continues while the argument about theMarxist inheritance is by no means over. What would Marxhimself have to say about the Soviet Union, and about the viewsand policies of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin concerning both it andthe Revolution leading to its formation? If some of his lastrecorded views are any guide, he would have been surprised bythe events of 1917:I would consider a European war a misfortune; this time aterrible misfortune. It would inflame chauvinismeverywhere for years, as every country would have to fightfor its existence. The whole work of the revolutionaries inRussia, who stand on the eve of victory, would be annihil-ated and made in vain.31And then, we might ask, could it be that his analysis ofStalinism in particular would lead him back to his early viewthat, unlike the converse norm in Britain, France and evenGermany, the development of Russian society was mostlyinfluenced by the development of the state? Of course, we shallnever know: perhaps we cannot remind ourselves too oftenthat Marx died in 1883, several decades before the course ofevents that he had sketched just before his death came to theirfull development in circumstances far different. But certainlyhis ideas were used to promote revolution as much as those ofMontesquieu had previously been used to underpinconstitutions. At the same time, arguably, at least some of thewould-be leaders of a Russian Revolution looked back beyondMarx for guidance to the French precedent, updating theretrospection of Robespierre and his colleagues beyond thephilosophes to classical times.