Tuesday, October 20, 2020

 INTRODUCTION7considerable amount of elaboration: indeed, five chapters havebeen considered a bare minimum. In the rest of this Introduction,therefore, I explain how the rest of the book is structured, andwhat I aim to do in it. After the prologue constituted by thisIntroduction, the five chapters address the theme roughly in themanner of the five acts of classical drama: Chapters 1 and 2 areexposition; Chapters 3 and 4 are development; and Chapter 5 isconclusion or denouement. The main plot is Westerninterpretation of world order in history and Russia’s place in it.However, there is a sub-plot: comparative American-Russianhistory examined against the expanding background of the movefrom European to Atlantic ‘civilisation’, and then on to an all-embracing ‘new world order’. Incidentally, too, such questionsas the relationship between the arts and sciences are touchedupon. The actors are mainly academic or intellectual in theirprimary interest, but there are some who are doers rather thanthinkers, and a few who are a mixture of both.The first two chapters set out two kinds of modern Westernorder, constitutional and revolutionary, of which earlydefinitions were given by Maximilien de Robespierre in a speechdelivered at the end of a year of tumult and Terror on 25December 1793:The goal of the constitutional government is to maintainthe Republic; that of the revolutionary government, tofound it.The revolution is the war of liberty against its enemies;the constitution is the regime of liberty, victorious andpeaceable.The revolutionary government demands extraordinaryactivity precisely because it is at war. It is subject to lessuniform and less rigorous laws because prevailingcircumstances are stormy and changing and, above all,because it is forced constantly to deploy new and speedyresources to meet new and pressing dangers.The constitutional government is concerned principallywith civil liberty; the revolutionary government, withpublic liberty. Under the constitutional regime little moreis required than to protect individuals against the abuseof the public power; under the revolutionary regime, the

welcoming it. And so on. To some extent, differences may bereduced by a number of approaches, of which the most fruitfulis the comparative. This approach is of two kinds: the synchronicand the diachronic. That is, one may consider any historicalphenomenon in the global context of the time at which it madeitself known—synchronic—or trace its development andconsequences (and/or its antecedents and origins) throughtime— diachronic. For example, Catherine the Great could beconsidered either as one of the enlightened despots or absolutistsof the late eighteenth century or as one of a succession of Russianrulers after Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great but beforeNicholas II and Lenin. Similarly, Pugachev could be comparednot only with such predecessors as Bolotnikov, Razin andBulavin—all leaders of peasant revolts in Russia—but also withsuccessors, including some of the peasant insurgents in theRevolution of 1917, or with similar figures elsewhere in theeighteenth century.7 There may indeed be distant echoes of theedicts of Pugachev in the promises and threats of Zhirinovsky,although more conventional parallels would be sought in morerecent ultra-nationalists at home or abroad. In fact, manycomparative approaches, including that to be adopted in thepresent book, are a mixture of the synchronic and the diachronic.To give one more example, the concepts in the slogan of Russia’sChoice—Liberty, Property, Legality—have evolved and beendiscussed in other countries over a longer period than in Russiaitself, as is already clear from the observations of Max Weber in1906, quoted above. We need to look no further than John Locke,who, at the time of the ‘Glorious and Bloodless Revolution’ of1688, gave much attention to liberty and property, along withlife, as basic human rights within the framework of civilgovernment, drawing on well-established English traditions oflegality as he did so. Looking forward from 1688, we could drawa line of development through to the American and FrenchRevolutions of the late eighteenth century and beyond. Here,as already mentioned in the Preface, special emphasis will begiven to the American case.Ultimately, any comparative investigation should be carriedout within some kind of global framework: hence the theme ofthis book, as clearly indicated in its title. Yet, though simpleenough to be spelled out in eight words, this basic idea has metso far with less than general acceptance, and therefore requires a

focus of attention from Russia to the world more generally, we canfind a convenient reminder of recent great changes in TheEconomist’s end-of-year suggestions for an updated list of the sevenwonders of the world first compiled in the second century BC.Here they are with their year of creation in brackets: themicroprocessor (1971); the ‘pill’ (1951); the global telephone net-work (still some way to go—Asia has more than half the world’spopulation, but only 7 per cent of its telephones); the ‘jumbo jet’(Boeing 747) (1968); the off-shore oil platform (1947); the hydrogenbomb (1952); the human moon landing (1969). Not everybodywould accept this list, but few would argue with the essentialsuggestion that the times we live in are indeed very different towhat they were fifty years ago.6Responses would probably vary according to generation, animportant consideration for current affairs and history alike.Arguably, the longer people have lived, the more likely they areto appreciate history’s essential component, the passage oftime, and to possess a sense of perspective on today’spreoccupations. On the other hand, while the senior citizenmight recall the days before the automobile and the aeroplane,he or she might also have difficulty in getting to grips with theimplications of such new-fangled hardware as the computerand the video-recorder, which most young people take toalmost as ducklings to water.But if we look forward, and assume that human beings will stillbe in existence in 2093, in a hundred years’ time there may well besome researchers pouring scorn on the short-sightedness of TheEconomist’s choice in 1993. ‘Why no mention of geneticengineering?’ one can imagine somebody asking in that far-forwardyear. None of us can yet perceive what the really significantdevelopments of our own time may turn out to be.Apart from partiality of generation, and of moment in time,there are other differences of viewpoint. Western attitudes willby no means always coincide with Russian, while within thesetwo main groups there will be further variations in worldoutlook, especially since the disestablishment of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. For example, on both sides, especially in the English-speaking world where the two words have distinctive meanings,there will be some who maintain that history is an art, otherswho insist that it is a science; everywhere, some will be moreconservative, resisting change, others more progressive,

 monarchy’ which she did much to develop fell short of encroachingon tsarist absolutism, which included rights and privileges for thenobility under the protection and patronage of the autocraticEmpress, and meant little if any advancement for the peasants.This injustice helped to spawn the uprising by Pugachev and hissupporters. In other words, Catherine’s ‘constitutionalism’ wasalready confronted by a primitive form of revolutionary oppositionin the shape of Cossack and peasant insurgents.During the nineteenth century, some significant advance wasmade by Russia as far as our key concepts of liberty, property andlegality were concerned. While Russia moved forward, however,the pace was even faster elsewhere, and the chances for fullassimilation of the main foundations of the Western way of lifeunder the tsarist (or indeed any) regime were severely limited. In1906, Max Weber wrote that:The historical development of modern ‘freedom’ presup-posed a unique and unrepeatable constellation of factors,of which the following are the most important: first,overseas expansion...secondly, the characteristic economicand social structure of the ‘early capitalist’ period inWestern Europe; thirdly, the conquest of life throughscience... finally, certain ideal conceptions which grew outof the concrete historical uniqueness of a particularreligious viewpoint.Looking at Russia in particular in the aftermath of the failedRevolution of 1905, Weber added:It is ridiculous in the extreme to ascribe to modern highcapitalism, as currently being imported into Russia...anyinner affinity with ‘democracy’ or even ‘freedom’ (in anysense of the word). The question is rather ‘How are any ofthese at all possible in the long run under its domi-nation?’5In the long perspective of 1993, perhaps, some of the voters forZhirinovsky were in unwitting agreement with Max Weber, as wellas reflecting traditional attitudes towards liberty, property andlegality.But 1993, of course, was very different from 1906 not only inRussia and the West but throughout the world. As we shift our

history. With this single act the monarchy created a large, privileged,Westernized leisure class, such as Russia had never known before.’Other scholars have since modified this evaluation considerably,some of them giving more emphasis to the Charter of the Nobilityof 1785, but most of them would accept that the 1762 manifestowas an important milestone along the road to the acquisition offull property rights by the Russian nobility as a class, if not so muchas individuals.3 Regarding the peasantry, passages from Pugachev’sedict of 1774 may be taken as indicative of popular attitudestowards property as well as other matters:With this personal decree we bestow our monarchical andpaternal generosity upon all those formerly in thepeasantry and subject to the landlords, be true slaves toour crown...and you may be Cossacks for ever, withoutdemands for recruit levies, poll and other money dues,possession of lands, woods and meadows and fishingrights, and salt lakes without tax and payment and wefree all from the evils caused by nobles and bribe-takingtown judges of the peasants, and taxes and burdens placedon all the people.Here, even more clearly than in the case of the nobility, we maysee that property rights are attributed to a class rather than toindividuals, emphasis thus being given to age-old communalcustoms and beliefs. Up to the Revolution of 1917 and beyond, thecommunal outlook remained strong, as did the belief that the landbelonged to those who cultivated it. Just before that Revolution,even the intellectuals of the liberal Kadet Party refused to defendland ownership as a private right; although most of them believedin such ownership in general, Western legal norms in this area metwith far from broad acceptance.4As is already apparent, no doubt, Western norms as a wholewere not universally recognised in pre-revolutionary Russia.Undoubtedly, some progress towards such recognition had beenmade from the later eighteenth century onwards, especially duringthe reign of Catherine II, or Catherine the Great. On the other hand,the Empress had come to power via the assassination of herhusband, Tsar Peter III, and had connived at this monstrous act ofillegality even if she did not actually instigate it. Having gainedthe supreme power, she was determined not to lose it. The ‘legal

 of the parties giving various degrees of support to the President.Boris Yeltsin himself was blamed by some journalists for theoutcome, in particular for not giving more support to Russia’sChoice, the only bloc committed to continuing economic reformsat a fast pace.Although this is not the place for a full analysis of the electionresults, or indeed of Russia’s Choice, we may approach at leastsome of the issues involved by turning our attention to acontradiction between the party’s symbol—Peter the Great—andits motto—Liberty, Property, Legality. In reality, Peter the Great whoruled Russia at the beginning of the eighteenth century had littleto do with the introduction of these three concepts, all of whichmade their first clear appearance there in the second half of theeighteenth century.‘Freedom and liberty’ make their first appearance in a decreeissued on 18 February 1762, granted by Tsar Peter III to the nobility.Even then, several strings remained attached, as may be seen inthe decree’s last words, commanding all the Emperor’s ‘obedientand true sons to despise and scorn’ those who evaded his service:such defaulters would ‘not be allowed to appear at Our Court, orat public meetings and celebrations’. A dozen or so years later, afalse ‘Peter in’ (in fact a Cossack named Pugachev masqueradingas the Emperor who had been murdered in the summer of 1762and replaced by Catherine II) rewarded his followers in a majorpeasant uprising with the same ‘freedom and liberty’ among othergifts, while giving the order in his edict of 31 July 1774 thatthose who were formerly nobles in their estates, theseopponents of our authority and disturbers of the empireand destroyers of the peasants catch, execute and hangand treat in the same way as they, not having Christianity,have dealt with you, the peasants.Arguably, the contradiction between two such views of freedomreached its climax in the Russian Revolution of 1917: certainly, wemay already see some of the distinctive features of Russian historyas a whole in the decrees of 1762 and 1774.2These two same documents may be used to illustrate conceptsof property as well as of freedom. Of the first of them, RichardPipes wrote in 1959: ‘Altogether, it is difficult to exaggerate theimportance of the edict of 1762 for Russia’s social and cultural

Monday, March 23, 2020

What is history?


What is history? What purpose is there in studying it? Over theyears, I have put such questions to many colleagues. I recall inparticular the answer given to the second of them by adistinguished professor at Yale, C.Vann Woodward: the eliminationof error. When I asked him if this was enough, he replied that hefound no shortage of error. Taking our subject at C.VannWoodward’s word, let us begin by making a couple of correc-tions.First, in a stimulating book by Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafsonentitled Russia 2010 and What It Means for the World, the authorswrite:The fact is that the West has been the main source ofexample and competition for Russia for a long time, eversince the Russian élite turned decisively towards Europeat the beginning of the seventeenth century. French and(later) German were the languages spoken at the tsaristcourts.1The fact is otherwise. The Russian élite did not turn decisivelytowards Europe before the end of the seventeenth century, eventhe beginning of the eighteenth century. German was then the main(foreign) language spoken at the tsarist court. French achieved amore comprehensive predominance later in the eighteenth century.To be sure, German made something of a come-back towards theend of the nineteenth century.Let us take as a second, more extended example one of theimportant news items from December 1993, the Russian electionresults. As is well known, these marked the rise of the oppositionultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party led by VladimirZhirinovsky, and the comparatively disappointing performance